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Abstract
The recent process of political and economic transformation in eastern
European countries has not only contributed to the decentralisation of political
structure but also significantly enhanced the fiscal autonomy of municipalities in
these countries. In this context many similar types of public activities have
recently been assigned to local governments, and some taxes were also
declared to be local taxes. To be sure, this type of fiscal decentralisation has
caused some additional problems, particularly for safeguarding the quality of
publicly provided goods and services and for co-ordinating intergovernmental
fiscal transfers between the central and local governments. For instance, some
criticise that many small-sized municipalities in the transition economies have
suffered from financial bottleneck and have not been able to receive sufficient
financial support from the central government. However, such a fiscal devolution
trend appears to continue. This study primarily deals with issues surrounding the
impact of national fiscal policy and the regulatory framework on local
governments’ expenditure behaviour and their ability to mobilise necessary
revenues under the particular consideration of the institutional and
administrative co-operation with the central government and of the less well-
developed financial market in Poland, the Slovak Republic, the Czech Republic
and Hungary.
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1. Introduction and Basic Theoretical Background
The relationship between central and local (and municipal) government is changing. For
this reason it has traditionally been a major subject of political discussions. The idea of
decentralisation of political decision-making has become increasingly fashionable
world-wide, which is also accompanied by fiscal decentralisation in most cases. In some
developed countries the systems of intergovernmental finance have evolved gradually
and each country has unique features (Ahmad, Hewitt and Ruggiero, 1997). Emerging
countries on different continents have had differing reasons and motivations for such
reforms and their consequences for macro-economic stability and growth have also var-
ied significantly from one country to another (Fukasaku and de Mello, 1999). More re-
cently, the acknowledgement of subsidiarity as the basic principle for the European Un-
ion, the introduction of the west German federal system in the eastern part of the coun-
try, the revival of regionalism in Western European countries like Portugal are distinc-
tive examples of the decentralisation process in Europe. This kind of political decen-
tralisation has also been pronounced in the transformation countries of Poland, the
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. To be sure, such development is “a reflection of
the political evolution toward more democratic and participatory forms of government,
seeking to improve the responsiveness and accountability of political leaders to their
electorate, and to ensure a closer correspondence of the quantity, quality, and composi-
tion of publicly provided goods and services to the preference of their beneficiaries”
(Ter-Minassian, 1997, p. 3).
Compared to the case for cities and municipalities in western Europe, those located in
the transformation countries have been confronted with more serious problems caused by
the speedy industrial modernisation and de-industrialisation, the rapidly increasing public
activities due to social, economic, health and environmental ills, as well as by the provi-
sion of additional new (city-specific) infrastructure that is often better adapted to newly
emerging economic activities. In particular, the challenges for large cities in Eastern
Europe have been more immediate and have also become more intensified in the course of
the ongoing economic and political transition. On the other hand, it is argued that since the
large agglomeration areas provide an unparalleled business environment to economic sec-
tors, rural regions and municipalities are at loss to compete, which, in turn, leads to the
increase in regional disparity in a country. As a result, municipalities in disadvantaged
regions suffer from a net reduction in population size, decreasing local tax revenue, fewer
job opportunities etc. Furthermore, cities and municipalities in transformation countries
seem to be (in some cases seriously) suffering from a lack of necessary financial means to3
cover the increasing expenditures and to meet current challenges. Such fiscal stress usually
takes place either when the costs of providing local services increase faster than revenues
needed to finance them, or when, at given costs of public service provision, local govern-
ment revenues are constrained by a declining economic base which reduces taxable re-
sources.
1
Following the so-called equalisation objectives, one easily tends to argue that those mu-
nicipalities and cities with greater spending needs automatically require more financial
support from central or upper-level government. Yet, the sum of grants to municipalities
should basically be induced from the comparison of their (existing and/or anticipated)
‘true’ expenditure needs with local fiscal capacity from their own resources such as local
tax revenue and fees.
2 To be sure, the expenditure behaviour of municipalities is also, to a
great extent, influenced by their present fiscal capacity as well as by the size of local debts.
In the provision of infrastructure, local governments tend to (critically) consider an in-
crease in local taxes, especially when intergovernmental grants to municipalities do not
adequately compensate the existing fiscal stress that is caused by large expenditure needs,
and/or, when the total sum of local debts has already reached the maximum level that
should not be exceeded. In addition, the city or municipality with well-equipped infra-
structure is obviously more attractive for investors and firms looking for a new location,
while the increase in local taxes immediately means the loss of regional  and municipal
competitiveness. In the case that the additional provision of infrastructure will mainly be
financed by higher local taxes, local governments should also be well aware of such a
trade-off relationship and their short-term as well as long-term effects on the local econ-
omy (Nam, 2000; Nam, Nerb and Russ, 1990).
According to the well-known subsidiarity principle, efficiency in the allocation of fi-
nancial resources is best achieved by assigning responsibility for each type of expenditure
to the level of government that most closely represents the beneficiaries of provided public
goods and services (Frenkel, 1986; Hyman, 1993; Ter-Minassian, 1997). In other words,
the expenditure assignments involve decisions as to which level of government should be
                                           
1  For example, large German cities have continually lost part of their major income — revenue from trade taxes
(Gewerbesteuer) and income taxes — due particularly to the ongoing sub-urbanisation process and the recent eco-
nomic recession as well as the reduction of tax revenue caused by tax reforms. In addition, as a direct consequence of
unification, grants from upper-level governments to the cities in the context of the German intergovernmental re-
source allocation system (Finanzausgleich) have been partly reduced.
2  It is widely accepted fact that ‘needs’ are subjective and, therefore, cannot be easily quantified. Nevertheless, a large
number of resource transfer methods between different levels of government and of measurement methods of local
expenditure needs have been developed in the past and also implemented in many industrialised countries, which
range from exclusively political to straightforward statistical ones. Furthermore, there have been serious and ambi-
tious efforts to devise as well as to improve these methodologies, so that the so-called true financial needs of munici-
palities could be measured in a more effective and systematic way. In particular, the dispute about the relationship4
predominantly responsible for the formulation, financing and administration of policy ac-
tivities and related follow-ups. Compared to the apparent cases for the central provision of
national public goods and services like macro-economic stabilisation, redistribution, de-
fence and foreign affairs,
3 those activities related to social protection, education and health
as well as environment have generally been considered as typical public services which
can be well provided by local or regional governments. Yet, in most cases public goods
have a character of mixed goods, for which some degree of decentralisation combined
with some centralised co-ordination appears to be feasible and desirable, due to unclear
distribution of benefits among regions, externalities and spill-overs, etc. As a conse-
quence, overlapping responsibilities in policy formulation, financing and administration
of public goods and services are quite common, which have also partly contributed to
the existing great variety of intergovernmental fiscal arrangements and expenditure as-
signments among different countries (Levin, 1990; Ahmad, Hewitt and Ruggiero,
1997).
4 Furthermore, the central government in many countries can influence the de-
centralised provision of public goods through the regulation of their delivery in terms of
quality and the ex post control of the use of financial means and transfers.
The strong policy orientation of allocation objectives in terms of the devolution of ex-
penditure responsibilities to local governments can create conflicts with the achievement
of the macro-economic stabilisation and the redistributive goal, which appear to be better
accomplished by the central government (Musgrave, 1983; Oates, 1972). Although “the
overall levels of expenditures of [regional or local] governments is effectively constrained
by limits on their taxation and borrowing powers, changes in composition [for example, in
favour of transfers to individuals with a high propensity to consume] may run counter to
the stabilisation objective of the central government” (Ter-Minassian, 1997, p. 5). Empiri-
cal investigations (including Brosio, 1985) do not always confirm the so-called Leviathan
hypothesis by Brennan and Buchanan (1980) that decentralisation generally limits the
growth of total government expenditure. Furthermore, “with increased decentralisation
comes the possibility of loss of macroeconomic control as local bureaucracies multiply,
                                                                                                                               
between the per capita level of local expenditure needs and the size of the municipality (in terms of population size)
has not yet been fully settled (Nam, 2000).
3  According to the conventional literature, this type of centralisation is necessary when (a) certain public goods
have non-rival consumption within an entire country as is the case for defence and macro-economic policies, (b)
significant economies of scale are present in the provision of these goods, and (c) undesirable population and
capital movement can result from variations in policy and the level of provision between jurisdictions.
4  “For instance, there are certain efficiency advantages to local supply of primary education and preventive health
care, such as possibly better quality through local supervision, and allowance for communities to express cultural
and curative preferences. For tertiary education and hospitals, existence of economies of scale and externalities
(their benefits accruing to more than on jurisdiction) imply that more centralized control may be warranted. How-
ever, the demand for minimum standards often requires that centralized decision making of policies be ensured
for all these [local public] services” (Ahmad, Hewitt and Ruggiero, 1997, p. 25).5
[which make] monitoring and evaluation more problematic [...]” (Ahmad, Hewitt and
Ruggiero, 1997, p. 31).
5 In a country with large economic disparity among its regions, the
ability of local or regional governments to deliver public goods and services can also vary
widely, which, in turn, could trigger undesirable internal migration.
6 In countries in transi-
tion such type of economic policy conflicts appear to be more adequately taken into ac-
count in making decision about assigning certain expenditure responsibilities to local gov-
ernments.
The general principles of decentralisation also guide the assignment of taxes to different
levels of government. In practice, two options of assigning funds to local jurisdictions are
commonly adopted but quite often in a combined form:
•   assignment of (some) taxing power to the central government and financing local ex-
penditure needs by intergovernmental grants or other transfers, for example, in form of
sharing tax revenue, and
•   assignment of (some) taxing power to the local governments, if necessary comple-
menting the revenue (raised locally) with tax-sharing arrangements with the central
government (Norregaard, 1997).
Table 1 illustrates more precisely how different types of taxes and grants can be as-
signed to the lower level of governments.
                                           
5  The macro-economic stabilisation function is generally judged to be inappropriate for subnational assignment,
because “(a) raising debt at the local level would entail higher regional costs while the benefits would spill be-
yond regional borders, and too little stabilisation would be provided as a result; (b) the monetisation of local debt
will create inflationary pressure and pose a threat for price stability; (c) currency stability requires that both
monetary and fiscal policy functions belong to the centre alone; and (d) cyclical shocks are usually national in
scope and therefore require a national response” (Shah, 1999, p. 38).
6  On the other hand, the Tiebout and tax competition models show that competition among local governments
induces localities to provide an efficient configuration of local public goods (Tiebout, 1961). Since residents are
mobile between localities, these theories argue that they will select the area which offers them the optimum com-
bination of public service and taxes to pay.6






Base and rate under local control
Nation-wide tax base but rates under local control
Nation-wide base and rates, but with a fixed portion of the tax revenue
(on a tax-by-tax basis or on the basis of pool of different tax sources)
being allocated to the local governments in question, based on (1) the
revenue accruing within each jurisdiction (also so-called the derivation
principle) or (2) other criteria, typically population, expenditure needs,
and/or tax capacity.
Local government’s share is fixed by central government (usually with
a re-distributive element), but the former is free to determine how the
grants should be spent; the amounts received by individual authorities
may depend on their tax efforts.
The absolute sum of grant may be determined by central government or
it may be open-ended (i.e. dependent on the expenditure levels decided
by lower levels of government), but in either case central government
specifies the expenditure programmes for which the funds should be
spent.
Source: Norregaard (1997), Tax Assignment, Washington DC.
According to the standard theory of public economics (Oates, 1972; Musgrave and Mus-
grave, 1980; King, 1984), there are several characteristics for typical local taxes, which
financially support a decentralised public expenditure system:
•   The base of local taxes should be neither very mobile nor very unevenly distributed
among jurisdictions. In the case of prevailing strong mobility, taxpayers will relocate
the income activities or tax sources from high to low areas. This fact will also limit the
freedom of local governments to change the rates.
•   Local taxes should be accountable and local taxpayers should know what the tax li-
abilities are. In addition, they should be fairly easy to administer on the local level.
•   The link between payment of the tax and local service received should be intact. In
other words, such benefits should be strongly internalised to the local taxpayers.
•   Local taxes should be able to generate sufficient revenue to avoid large vertical imbal-
ances and ideally be less sensitive to the changes in business cycle.
In accordance with such criteria mentioned above, land or property taxes and, to some
extent, personal income taxes have been quite often suggested to be suitable local taxes,
while corporate income taxes have usually been considered to be less appropriate for the
same purpose (Paugam, 1999). For example, “[in] some countries, state-level taxation of
corporate profits, in the absence of a coordinated approach, has been accompanied by
strong competition (tax wars), leading to distortions in enterprise’s location decisions, tax7
avoidance through transfer pricing by enterprises operating in multiple areas, and erosion
of revenue” (Ter-Minassian, 1997, p. 10).
Intergovernmental transfers are aimed at rectifying not only the vertical imbalance
caused by the unequal own tax revenues and expenditures of different levels of govern-
ments but also the horizontal imbalance which is led by the different fiscal capacities
among same level jurisdictions. Although the local expenditure needs appear to be hardly
measured in an objective way, the role of transfers becomes more crucial for those deficit
jurisdictions on the sub-national level, especially when their increasing expenditures can-
not be financed by borrowing or they lack direct access to capital markets. In the cases of
existing externalities on other jurisdictions, the central government also needs to finan-
cially support sub-national authorities in order to guarantee the provision of certain public
services on the local level like pollution control, inter-regional highways, etc. (Davis and
Lucker, 1982; Frenkel, 1986; Ali, Lerme and Nakosteen, 1993; Boadway and Hobson,
1993; Hyman, 1993; Rosen, 1995; Dahlby, 1996; Ahmad and Craig, 1997). Furthermore,
the amount of grants should vary with the local expenditure needs and inversely with local
fiscal capacity, while their distribution must be transparent and fair. More importantly, an
effective transfer system should neither encourage overspending nor weaken tax collection
efforts on the sub-national level (Gage and Mandell, 1990; Jones and Cullis, 1994; Bahl
and Linn, 1994; Shah, 1994a and 1994b; Winkler, 1994; Oates, 1998; Nam, Parsche and
Steinherr, 2001).
Basically the re-allocation of fiscal resources from one level of government to another
takes place through sharing of tax revenues or through a form of grants. In the case of
revenue sharing, tax bases can be shared on a tax-by-tax basis (in some cases with differ-
ent coefficients of distribution among levels of government for each tax),
7 or taxes can be
pooled and shared systematically thereafter, as illustrated in Table 1. According to the pre-
vious experiences in emerging countries, such revenue sharing arrangements appear to be
less successful in encouraging local revenue mobilisation (Fukasaku and de Mello, 1999).
Grants from higher (federal or state) to lower levels (state or local) can be conditional (i.e.
closely tied with specifications regarding the use of the funds and/or the performance
                                           
7  This type of arrangement “may provide an incentive for the [central government] to concentrate its collection and
enforcement efforts on the taxes that are not shared or are shared to a lesser extent.[...] Fixed revenue-sharing [in-
cluding the determination of revenue portion going to the local and regional governments, e.g. in terms of a con-
stant rate to the shared tax base] can also have pro-cyclical [macro-economic] effects, as increases in shared reve-
nues during periods of boom increase the capacity to spend of the [local or regional] governments, while decline
in revenues during economic downturns force them to cut back spending. [...] The distribution of shared revenues
among subnational jurisdictions is often made on a derivation basis, with each jurisdiction getting the share of the
revenue collected in its territory. [Yet, such a type of distribution method appears to be less suitable] to correct
horizontal imbalances, under [the derivation principle] the level of the transfer from the centre to each subnational
government is positively correlated with the taxing capacity of the latter” (Ter-Minassian, 1997, p. 12f.).8
achieved in the supported programme),
8 or unconditional respecting the autonomy of local
governments in spending such financial means. The so-called block grants also have a
fixed character, which are, however, designed to support broad areas of local activities
(like education, environmental preservation, etc.) rather than specific projects. On the
other hand, intergovernmental grants can be open-ended
9 — regardless of the transfer size
required to cover the expenditure needs of individual local governments — or subject to
certain limits. In addition, the down-flow grants have been quite often made in the EU on
the basis of the so-called additionality principle, which requires — as a eligibility criterion
for the supporting grants — the partial financial participation of local governments in pro-
viding local goods and services in its territory.
10
Borrowing has traditionally been an important source to finance long-term public infra-
structure projects in advanced countries, because it enhances intergenerational equity. In
other words, these projects yield returns through several generations, over which the costs
for the provision of public goods should be shared equally. Such type of intergenerational
burden sharing enables small local governments to undertake the necessary large scale
infrastructure investments (Shah, 1999). However, some countries still impose strict re-
strictions on local borrowing. For example, in some developing and transformation coun-
tries large infrastructure projects have recently been more strongly supported in terms of
capital grants or on-lending from higher level governments, since local governments (es-
pecially in the small entities due to their weak economic power, small size of tax income
                                           
8  In most cases the imposition of conditions can be justified from the redistribution point of view, for example, to
guarantee the minimum nation-wide standards for the provision of services of national concern like primary edu-
cation, health care, pollution control, etc. (Ahmad and Craig, 1997).
9  Those who favour the sound development of national budget and macro-economic stability as well as the reduc-
tion of corruption tend to be against those open-end types of grants.
10  In countries like Canada, Australia, Japan and the United Kingdom, tax bases between the central and sub-
national (state and local) government are divided in a way that the former receives a significantly or extremely
higher share of total tax revenues. At the same time, the central government provides specific and unconditional
(i.e. general) grants for the lower level governments. The general grants are in most cases equalisation-oriented
and aimed at rectifying regional disparities (Peacock, 1977; Chandler and Zollner, 1986; Watts, 1991; Boadway
and Hubson, 1993; Elzar, 1997; Ma, 1997; Worthington, Dollery and Edward, 1998). The United States has a
marked preference for conditional grants: In the early 1990s matching grants amounted to more than 90% of federal
intergovernmental transfers to state and local governments (Rosen, 1995). Germany has a unique tax assignment sys-
tem: All major taxes (personal and corporate income taxes as well as value added tax) are shared by the federal
(Bund), state (Länder) and municipal (Gemeinde) governments. Altogether these shared taxes currently amount to ca.
two thirds of tax revenues in the country. In the context of the so-called German state resource allocation system
(Länderfinanzausgleich) unconditional grants are made from states with above-average fiscal capacities (e.g. Bavaria,
Baden-Württemberg and Hesse) to states with below-average fiscal capacities (e.g. Saarland, Lower Saxony and New
German Länder). In addition, the federal government offers supplementary grants to the financially weak states in the
eastern and western parts of Germany, of which some also have conditional character (e.g. for solving debt service
problems in Bremen and Saarland). Unconditional transfers from state governments to local authorities also occur
within a state in the context of the so-called municipal resource allocation system (Kommunalfinanzausgleich).9
and other unfavourable creditworthiness) quite often suffer from the lack of direct access
to credit markets.
11
More importantly, fiscal deficits and debt have continuously risen over time in a large
number of countries both at the state and local levels. The rapid growth of local public
debt in a country, which eventually endangers the macro-economic stability, also immedi-
ately questions whether the local borrowing is tightly oriented to the necessary financial
needs for well-designed local public projects, and its process is transparent and efficient
enough in an administrative term. In general there are four basic debt-control categories
which are applied in practice in combined forms:
•   primary reliance on market discipline without the so-called bail-out guarantee of the
central government when the credit market is free and transparent information prevails
(Lane, 1993),
•   a dialogue-oriented co-operation and negotiation among different levels of govern-
ments in the design and implementation of debt controls (including limits on the in-
debtedness of sub-national governments),
•   rules-based controls as specified in the constitution or by law regarding, for example,
setting on the purpose- or project-oriented limits of the absolute level of local debts,
12
and
•   direct administrative controls of the central government over local borrowing, including
setting of annual limits on the overall debt of individual sub-national jurisdictions, the
tight review and authorisation of individual borrowing operations like credit approvals
(or the centralisation of all government borrowing) and the ex post monitoring, etc.
(Ter-Minassian, 1997; Ter-Minassian and Craig, 1997; Shah, 1999).
All these controls can also be classified into passive and active controls, as illustrated in
Table 2.
                                           
11  Developing countries like India and Pakistan, for example, do not allow local governments to access credit mar-
kets.
12  “Rules-based approaches have the obvious advantage of transparency and even-handedness, as well as of avoid-
ing protracted bargaining between the central and the [local governments, but] lack flexibility [...]” (Ter-
Minasssian and Craig, 1997, p. 166).10
Table 2 Active and passive controls over local borrowings
Passive controls These types of local debt controls have many forms, from broad guidelines on
allowable ranges of debt/revenue and debt charges/own-source revenue ratios,
to more specific golden rules, which permit borrowing only for capital forma-
tion but forbid it for financing current deficits.
Active controls More active controls on local borrowing include centrally specified limits on
capital spending of each local government, central government approval of
submitted local project and local debts (including bond finance) and seeking
community mandates on borrowing plans through popular referenda.
Source: Shah (1999), Fiscal Federalism and Macroeconomic Governance: for Better or for
Worse?, OECD, Paris; Spahn (1999), Decentralization, Local Government Capacity and Credit-
worthiness: Macroeconomic Aspects, The World Bank, Washington DC.
As mentioned before, the provision of public services and infrastructure and their fi-
nance is being decentralised in Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.
However, the national fiscal policy and regulatory framework appears to still have a
crucial impact on local governments’ expenditure behaviour and to limit their ability to
mobilise own tax income. In addition, the expanded local government role in providing
public services and in obtaining the necessary financial resources remain disturbed by
the weak institutional and administrative co-operation with the central government and
by the less well-developed financial market. This comparative study aims at examining
principal and immediate issues on political and fiscal decentralisation in the selected
European transformation countries including expenditure and revenue assignments, in-
tergovernmental transfer systems, local borrowings, etc. In addition, an empirical at-
tempt is made on the basis of available data to identify the recent development of mu-
nicipal expenditures and revenues in these countries.
2. Comparison of Similarities and Differences in Municipal Finance in Poland,
the Slovak Republic, the Czech Republic and Hungary
2.1. Fiscal Decentralisation in Selected Eastern European Countries
The recent process of political and economic transformation in eastern European countries
has not only contributed to the decentralisation of political structure but also significantly
enhanced the fiscal autonomy of municipalities belonging to these countries. For example,
the number of Czech and Hungarian municipalities rapidly grew at the beginning of the11
1990s, whose development had been significantly hindered by the politically forced amal-
gamation policy under the former communist regimes. As a consequence, the size of mu-
nicipalities measured in terms of the number of inhabitants is rather small in these Euro-
pean transition countries. For example, the number of Czech municipalities increased by
50% between 1990 and 1992 and reach 6237 municipalities at present, of which 87% are
with less than 1500 inhabitants. In Hungary the number multiplied from 1523 (1990) to
3154 (1999) and the average size of municipality is currently 3482 inhabitants.
Although the degree of self-governing ability of municipalities seems to vary from one
country to another, many similar types of public activities have recently been assigned to
local governments, and some taxes were also declared to be so-called local taxes. To be
sure, this type of fiscal decentralisation has also caused some additional problems, par-
ticularly for safeguarding the quality of publicly provided goods and services and for co-
ordinating intergovernmental fiscal affairs between the central and local governments in
an efficient way. For instance, some criticise that a large number of small-sized munici-
palities in the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Hungary and Poland have suffered
from financial bottleneck and have not been able to receive financial support from the
central government that was necessary for their economic development.
In these investigated countries, the process of ‘real’ political and fiscal decentralisation
took place at the beginning of the 1990s. In 1990, Hungary and Slovakia introduced simi-
lar types of laws to guarantee the municipal finance and governance, while a large number
of traditional Polish gminas (municipalities) acquired true self-governing autonomy after
the long socialist era. However, the implementation of fiscal decentralisation has been a
‘trial and error’ process. These transformation countries have had a series of legislative
acts and several relevant reforms (including tax reforms) in the past 10 years which dealt
with the mutual fiscal relations between different tiers of jurisdictions, the tasks and
authorities of local governments, the local budgetary systems, financial management and
expenditure control mechanisms, etc. The Hungarian Law of Local Self-Government, for
example, gives a wide scope for local governments to set the quantity and quality of public
goods and services and the ways that their provisions are to be organised and adminis-
tered. On the other hand, this law has been criticised because it does not emphasise the so-
called inter-juridical spill-overs of public goods and services and, as a consequence, this
law encourages non-cooperative behaviour of local governments when providing such
goods and services. As the 1999 self-government reform in Poland shows, municipalities
are expected to gain additional responsibilities, and their tax autonomy may expand in
the future. The establishment of regional governments (a self-governing intermediate12
tier of local governments) in the Czech Republic and Poland at the end of 1999 was not
aimed at reducing the autonomy of municipalities at all.
2.2. Expenditure Assignments
Typical public activities assigned to local governments in the investigated Eastern Euro-
pean countries include:
•   land management and planning, zoning and local environmental protection,
•   municipal budget and property management,
•   provision of local roads, bridges, streets and public transport system,
•   water supply as well as municipal waste treatment,
•   primary health care and social welfare services,
•   municipal housing,
•   elementary education including kindergarten,
•   promotion of culture and sport,
•   public order and fire protection, etc.
In the Czech Republic the provision of such local public goods and services is some-
what differently organised. For education (the most important ‘own’ local activities),
municipalities are responsible for the provision of pre-school facilities and primary
schools (up to 15 years of age), as far as the maintenance of buildings and operating
costs are concerned. On the other hand, teachers’ wages are paid out of the central
budget. In general, private companies carry out the task of solid waste collection. Water
supply and waste disposal systems were also largely privatised, although municipalities
have substantial equity shares in these companies. Local governments have also 34% of
stock shares of companies distributing gas and electricity. The health care system is or-
ganised by health insurance companies in the Czech Republic. The so-called ‘delegated’
responsibilities of municipalities include keeping the birth, marriage and death registers,
the implementation of construction and physical planning law. Environmental protec-
tion, the provision of local transportation, ensuring water standards, sanitation etc. also
belong to this responsibility group. Only 6% of municipalities currently provide all these
delegated functions, from which the surrounding smaller municipalities can also benefit
in the context of inter-municipal agreements or by the district office decrees. The mu-
nicipal expenditures related to the provision of delegated local activities are partly cov-
ered by grants from the central government.
In all the investigated countries, there are no regulations and norms set by the central
government concerning the minimum level of services expected from local service pro-13
viders. For the above-mentioned delegated responsibilities in the Czech Republic, spe-
cial laws clearly prescribe the ways a municipality should carry out these activities. In
case a municipality does not provide local services by itself but the provision is made by
a private body or non-profit organisation, municipalities usually define the level and
quality of the provided goods and services.
The analyses on the mid-term development of municipal expenditures are generally
concentrated on the years between 1993 and 1999. The recent changes in local expendi-
tures of a country well correspond to the development of the macro-economic business
cycle in the same country. For example, a continuous growth of total local expenditures
was observed in Poland from ca. 28 to 48 billion zlotys (expressed at 1998 prices) between
1994 and 1998. In Slovakia, the amount expressed at current prices increased from 19
billion SKK (1994), reached a peak at 27 billion SKK in 1997 and declined gradually
thereafter (24 billion SKK in 1999), while the Czech annual values between 1997-99
showed a continuous upward trend from 134 to 150 billion CZK. Hungary’s municipal
expenditures also grew from ca. 611 to 1110 billion HUF over the years 1993-97.
Municipal expenditures generally consist of (a) operating expenditures for ensuring
the proper functioning of existing local goods as well as public services and the follow-
up expenses caused by the realisation of local infrastructure projects, and (b) investment
expenditures for the provision of new infrastructure. Over all the investigated years the
operating expenditures dominated: In Hungary and Poland, the operating (i.e. current) ex-
penditures comprised around 80% of the total sum of municipal expenditures, while the
share reached over 60% in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Among major local activi-
ties, the largest expenditure category was education in Hungary and Poland: both countries
spent more than 30% of total (operating and investment) annual expenditures for this ac-
tivity. The Polish gminas were very eager to improve the endowment of water supply and
waste disposal networks and facilities. Consequently, gminas spent approximately 50% of
total investment expenditures (i.e. half of 6 billion zlotys in 1998) for such infrastructure
projects every year. While Hungarian local governments have allocated ca. 2.5% of GDP
for financing municipal investments each year, those off-budget service enterprises like
public companies, NGOs and private firms owned partly by local governments have also
carried out investment activities of which the annual sum corresponds to 1.5% of GDP. In
addition, it is to be noted that Polish municipalities’ investments have been financially
covered mostly by the gminas’ exclusive tax revenues which have also been supplemented
by borrowings from private banks and various public funds for environmental protection
and water management. In comparison, the same activity has been substantially financed
by the sales of local properties and the grants from the central government in Hungary.14
In Poland, local expenditures of urban gminas with strong economic bases comprised
by far the highest share (on average over 55%) of the total amount of municipal expen-
ditures, followed by rural municipalities (over 20%) and cities with rural districts (under
20%). The concentration of local expenditures on large urban municipalities can be ex-
plained by their specific function as the so-called central places for surroundings as well
as by their strong economic bases that generate higher fiscal revenues. However, the
share of urban gminas declined in the years between 1994 and 1998, in contrast to the
rural types where the share was evidently growing. Such a positive trend for rural areas
was caused by the implementation of investment projects which were initiated and sup-
ported by the central government and the different levels of Funds for Environmental
Protection and Water Management. The average amount of gminas’ total expenditure
per inhabitant rose rapidly from ca. 730 zlotys in 1994 to 1230 zloyts in 1998, but its
disparity has remained quite high between urban and rural gminas (compare, for exam-
ple, ca. 2100 zlotys for Warsaw and 880 zlotys for the rural Zamosc Province). The
level of per capita investment expenditures for urban gminas was also far above the av-
erage for total municipalities (e.g. 560 zlotys for Warsaw compared to the average of
276 zlotys in 1998). This fact again indicates that there has been a strong link between
the level of investment expenditures and the gminas’ fiscal income.
2.3. Revenue Assignments
In recent years, the development of local budgetary revenues was quite expansive in the
investigated eastern European countries. For instance, Polish, Hungarian and Czech
municipalities experienced continuously increasing total fiscal revenues, although rele-
vant statistics are available in the latter two countries only in nominal terms. Municipal
revenues increased in Poland from approximately 28 billion to 49 billion zlotys in the
period 1994-98 in real terms, in the Czech Republic 108 billion to 210 billion CZK be-
tween 1994 and 1999 and in Hungary from 861 billion to 1568 billion HUF over the
years from 1995 to 2000 (Table 3). In addition, the size of so-called ‘off-budget’ reve-
nues is estimated to be ca. 10% to 30% of the total local government budget in Hungary.
The Slovak case is rather different: municipalities in this country experienced the peak
of the total revenue level in 1998 (at ca. 29 billion SKK). Furthermore, the per capita
fiscal income level was always the highest for urban municipalities in Poland (e.g. 1352
zlotys for urban municipalities compared to 1193 zlotys for all in 1998). This was15
mainly caused by the highest level of exclusive local revenues yielded in this type of
gminas (= 503 zlotys compared to 399 zlotys for all municipalities at the same year).
The total fiscal capacity of municipalities is basically determined by (a) exclusive
revenues from local taxes, local fees and user charges, (b) a municipality’s surcharge on
shared taxes, mostly on personal and corporate income (c) revenues from the sale or rent
of municipal property, (d) bond dues, bank credits and other interest income, (e) income
of municipal companies, and (f) general and special subsidies and grants of the central
government, etc.
The local tax system differs from one country to another. In Slovakia and the Czech
Republic, real estate taxes (e.g. land value tax and buildings tax) are typically local ones.
On the other hand, the list of local taxes is quite long for Poland and Hungary. In the
former country, real estate tax, agricultural tax, forest tax, transportation tax, tax on
business activity and inheritance and gift taxes are part of those local taxes, while in
Hungary, business tax, real estate tax, tourism tax and urban land tax are presently col-
lected by municipalities in a selective way. The business tax — by far the most impor-
tant financial source — has been increasingly gaining significance in recent years. Yet,
the relevant decisions on tax bases, rates and deductibles of local taxes are generally
made by the central government in these investigated countries.
Local fees and charges — the second source of exclusive local fiscal income — are
imposed, for instance in the Czech Republic as well as in the Slovak Republic, on the
ownership of dogs, the sales of alcoholic and tobacco products, the usage of public ter-
ritory, on municipal advertisements, for entrance of motor vehicles to historical town
centres, for entertaining and pin-ball machines, for spa cures and recreational stays, etc.
The Czech and Slovak central governments determine the range and the upper-limits of
local fees that are practically administered by local governments. In Hungary, for exam-
ple, local governments are free to set their own level of charges for water supply, sew-
age treatment, housing, district heating and lighting, garbage collection, etc., but not for
charges for education, social and health services. For those conceded services to private
partners (i.e. public-private partnership), adjustments in user charges are generally made
on the basis of agreements between the two parties in Hungary.16
Table 3 Classification of recent municipal budgetary revenues according to
the individual revenue items
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Those exclusive revenues (i.e. local taxes and local fees) have recently comprised
around 35% of the total fiscal revenues and consequently were the most important fi-
nancial means to meet municipal expenditures in Poland and the Czech Republic, al-
though their significance declined slightly in the investigated years. In Hungary, the cor-
responding share remained around 30% between 1995 and 2000. By contrast, real estate
tax and local fees have played a less crucial role as revenue sources for the Slovak mu-
nicipalities (with approx. 15% of total local fiscal revenues).17
As mentioned before, personal and corporate income taxes are the most common shared
taxes in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia. Road tax is additionally designated for
tax sharing in Slovakia. In particular, revenues from personal income tax sharing (at ca.
60% to 80% of the total shared tax revenues) have recently been dominant in these coun-
tries, although corporate income tax has gradually gained significance in the course of
time. In Hungary, personal income tax was an important shared tax until the mid-1990s,
together with motor vehicle tax and tax on land rents. In this country the municipal shares
and distribution rules of personal income tax revenues have been modified annually: e.g.
in 1990 the entire sum of revenues was allocated to municipalities but the municipal share
reduced to 40% at the end of 1990s. Subsequently, the share of revenues from the sharing
of personal income tax for the total local fiscal capacity decreased from 24% to 2% in the
1990s.
The so-called non-tax revenues from the sale of municipality property like real estate,
flats, municipal firms, etc., property rental, business income resulting from municipal
firms and local governments’ participation in private companies have recently been quite
significant in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. For example, the share of this item
amounted to more than 35% and 33% respectively of the total budgetary revenues in these
countries in 1999. The sales of local assets turned out to be a new crucial financial source
for Hungarian municipalities just after the redefinition of asset price structure in the mid-
1990s, although they usually have the ‘one-time’ revenue character. In this country the
share of non-tax revenues reached its maximum in 1997 at 11% of total local revenues. In
addition, these assets have been quite unevenly distributed among municipalities.
2.4. Intergovernmental Transfer Systems
The intergovernmental transfer and grant system is quite heterogeneous in the investigated
European transformation countries. In the Czech Republic general (i.e. equivalence-
oriented) grants do not exist, and all transfers from the central government are specific
and purpose-oriented. In particular, capital grants (e.g. for hospitals, schools, water sup-
ply facilities, libraries, theatres, etc.) are generally allocated in line with the particular
government programmes. On the other hand, important operating grants are provided on
the formula-based system, and the basic down-flow transfer sum is defined, for exam-
ple, per pupil in the pre-school and primary school facilities, per bed in the elderly peo-
ple homes, etc. In 1999 operating grants amounted to 22 billion CZK compared to the
total sum of intergovernmental transfers of 33 billion CZK (= ca. 16% of total budgetary
revenues): both figures gradually increased between 1994 and 1999.18
In the Slovak Republic grants are made by the central government and the various state-
owned funds (like the State Environmental Fund, the State Fund for Housing Develop-
ment, etc.). Their absolute and relative significance (the latter measured in terms of the
share of total local revenues) experienced ups and downs in the period 1994-99 with a
peak of 5 billion SKK (= approximately 17% of the total local revenues) in 1997. Over
two thirds of such grants were project oriented (e.g. for providing public transport system,
construction of housing facilities, etc.) and strongly concentrated on large urban areas. The
equalisation-oriented general transfers have usually been addressed to small municipali-
ties (with less than 3000 inhabitants) that were particularly suffering from fiscal bottle-
necks. At present, a horizontal equalisation and resource transfer system from rich cities
to poor rural municipalities does not exist in Slovakia.
The Polish intergovernmental transfer system is quite simple and aims at achieving the
traditional goals of relieving the local fiscal constraints and guaranteeing and enhancing
the quality of local goods and services provided by local governments. The additional
assignment of maintaining elementary schools in 1996, the massive supports for general
educational activities and the (equity-oriented) promotion of economic development of
rural areas contributed to the rapid growth of gminas’ (real) revenues from ‘subsidies’ of
ca. 4 billion (= 15% of the total municipal revenues) to 12 billion (= 24% of the corre-
sponding revenues) zlotys between 1994 and 1998. On the other hand, ‘grants’ are
aimed at financing the specific municipal infrastructure projects that are exclusively
defined and commissioned by the central government: the total sum remained quite sta-
ble at around 6 billion zlotys but their share changed from 21% to 12% of the total reve-
nues in the investigated years.
Hungary currently has a quite complicated intergovernmental system and the most im-
portant sources for municipal finance in this country have been grants that comprised
around 60% of total budgetary revenues of local governments in the last 6 years. In gen-
eral, the down-flow transfers can be classified into the following different groups: (a)
normative grants, (b) purpose-oriented matching grants, (c) deficit grants, and (d) special
‘addressed’ and ‘targeted’ subsidies for supporting municipal investment activities, as well
as (e) the new grant for equalising fiscal capacity. The most substantial transfers are those
normative (partly also equivalence-oriented and formula-based) types that include per
capita grants based on the size of population, grants for core public services based on the
number of beneficiaries, capacity grants made on the basis of bed number in shelters for
homeless people and matching grants for the tourist tax. Their share amounted to ca. 40%
of the local budgetary revenues in 1993 but declined to 25% in 1998. Matching grants
with the increasing share of ca. 18% (1993) to 22% (1998) were mainly addressed to19
health care institutions. Deficit grants are aimed at supporting municipalities with high
fiscal deficits: in 1997 840 local governments received ca. 6 billion HUF of which the sum
increased to 12 billion HUF for 1230 municipalities in 1999. Although the size of such
deficit grants appears to be negligible, they tended to discourage revenue-raising efforts of
local governments and to reward increasing expenditures at the same time. Investment
activities related to water supply, health and social security, and education have been pro-
moted by the addressed and targeted grants of which the total sum is defined annually (e.g.
52 billion HUF for 2000). The targeted subsidies aim at reducing the effective investment
costs for promoted projects by a certain percentage share (usually 40% to 50%), while the
traditionally addressed types often cover the entire investment costs. The new grants for
fiscal equity introduced in 1999 are calculated on the basis of municipal business tax ca-
pacities and paid up to a given normative per capita level that varies according to munici-
pal types (e.g. villages, cities, etc.). In 1999 a sum of 38 billion HUF was distributed for
this purpose. As a whole, the shift from a general grant system toward a more project-
oriented down-flow transfer system was observed in the 1990s.
2.5. Municipal Borrowings and Debt Management
Local debts in forms of bank credits and communal bonds are relatively new financial
measures to cover the increasing expenditure needs of municipalities in the investigated
transition economies. Basically, there is neither a legal limit for local credits nor the inter-
vention of central government to restrict and to forbid such borrowing activities. Munici-
palities can borrow from domestic as well as from foreign banks, issue bonds on the
domestic or foreign markets, or borrow from non-banking institutions. In the Czech Re-
public, municipalities have generally been acknowledged as reliable debtors, because
there has not been a case of municipal default yet and all local borrowings have recently
been repaid without substantial delays, and a larger share of Czech municipalities have a
stable level of own and shared tax revenues and attractive real properties that, in turn,
determine the creditworthiness of municipalities in general. When issuing local bonds
(normally in co-operation with private banks), however, the approval is required by the
central government or its specific commission which examines borrowing conditions
under the relevant legal framework. Hungary is an exception: e.g. a debt service limit
for local governments and the general rule on issuing and trading municipal bonds were
introduced in 1996. Moreover, it has been quite rare to find special long-term oriented
lending mechanisms in the investigated countries by which the total credit sum can be paid
back through the revenues generated by future projects.20
In Poland, bank credits and public loans played a minor role in financing municipal ac-
tivities, although such types of borrowings rapidly increased from 198 million (i.e. 0.7% of
total municipal revenues) to 2674 million zlotys (i.e. 5.5% of the corresponding revenues)
between 1994 and 1999. Instead of old measures like preferential bank credits and public
loans, it is now becoming increasingly popular to take bank credits on ‘normal’ commer-
cial terms and to issue communal bonds. Regarding the bank credit structure of munici-
palities, there was also a movement of preponderance from short-term to mid-term credits:
the latter type was particularly important for financing investment projects in urban areas
(like public transportation systems). A number of urban gminas issued municipal bonds
(with the total value of more than 570 million zlotys between 1995 and 1998), which were
mainly for purchasing motor vehicles for the municipal transport system and/or for the
renewal of roads.
Apart from the Prague bond with a value of 7.4 billion CZK issued in 1994, the most
meaningful proportion of local debt has recently been the bank loans in the Czech Re-
public (notably from the Czech Savings Bank). Bank credits comprised ca. 44% of the
total local debts of 40 billion CZK compared to 27% for municipal bonds in 1999. Ac-
cording to the available data, the share of municipal borrowings amounted to 3.5% of
total local revenues of 108 billion CZK in 1994, of which the share reached ca. 19.1%
of the corresponding total revenues of 210 billion CZK in 1999.
In Slovakia, the amount of bank credits continuously increased from around 886 mil-
lion SKK in 1994 to 3163 million SKK in 1999, while the emission value of municipal
bonds fluctuated in the period between 1994 (40 million SKK) and 1999 (253 million
SKK). The comparable figures (40 and 253 million SKK for 1994 and 1999, respec-
tively) indicate that municipal borrowings in the form of issuing bonds are not yet ac-
knowledged as the way to obtain additional financial sources in this country. The share
of bank credits and municipal bonds increased from 4.6% to 11.6% of total budgetary
revenues of Slovak municipalities in the period between 1994 and 1999.
Hungarian municipalities have traditionally had low borrowings (e.g. around 23 billion
HUF in 1995 and 36 billion HUF in 2000). This item comprised, on average, ca. 2.7% of
the total local budgetary revenues for the individual years between 1995 and 2000. Such
low local borrowings were partly led by the weak engagement of private banks in this
matter and the grant-maximisation strategy of municipalities. The issuance of communal
bonds (22 cases) is presently underdeveloped in Hungary.
3. Summary and Concluding Remarks21
The trend of political decentralisation and fiscal devolution has recently been quite pro-
nounced in the eastern European transformation countries like Poland, the Czech Re-
public, Hungary and the Slovak Republic, which appears likely to continue in the future.
In the context of political and economic transition these countries have been trying to
implement democratic and participatory forms of governments on different levels not only
to improve the responsiveness and accountability of political leaders to their electorate but
also to ensure a closer correspondence of the quantity, quality, and composition of publicly
provided goods and services to the preference of their beneficiaries. To be sure, this proc-
ess has caused some additional problems, particularly for safeguarding the quality of pub-
licly provided goods and services and for co-ordinating intergovernmental fiscal affairs
between the central and local governments in an efficient way. In the investigated eastern
European countries the number of self-governing municipalities grew rapidly in the 1990s
and their average size, measured in terms of the number of inhabitants, is quite small. This
has quite often limited the expansion of the local economic base for generating own reve-
nues and hindered the realisation of economies of scale in collecting municipal tax reve-
nues and providing local public goods and services. Despite the insufficient availability
and poor quality of relevant statistics, one easily tends to argue that many small-sized less-
favoured municipalities have suffered from fiscal bottlenecks and have not been able to
receive financial support from the central government that are necessary for their eco-
nomic development and for the provision of local infrastructure.
Several similar types of public activities have been legally assigned to local govern-
ments in the investigated countries which include land planning and local environmental
protection, municipal housing and property management, local transport system, water
supply and waste disposal, primary health care and social welfare services, elementary
education, culture and sport, fire protection, etc. In general, there are no specific regula-
tions and norms set by the central government concerning the minimum level of services
expected from local service providers. The concentration of local expenditures on large
urban municipalities can also be explained by their specific function as the so-called
central places for surroundings as well as by their strong economic bases that generate
higher fiscal revenues. The importance of inter-juridical external effects of public goods
appears to be less adequately acknowledged by municipalities in the selected transition
economies until now, which has, in turn, encouraged the non-cooperative behaviour of
local governments when providing such goods. The public-private partnership is in-
creasingly becoming popular for local activities such as water supply, waste treatment
and public transport services. Local expenditures of municipalities in the investigated22
Eastern European countries tend to increase gradually, although their annual trend can
be partly disturbed by the development of the macro-economic business cycles.
In spite of the continuous growth of local budgetary revenues in previous years, the
ability of municipalities to mobilise own fiscal resources that are required to meet the
rapidly increasing expenditure needs is generally judged to be rather limited, partly be-
cause relevant decisions on local tax bases and rates as well as tax sharing schedules
have been made by the central government and/or subject to strict restrictions indicated
in the national tax law. Although the intergovernmental transfer system is constructed
differently from one country to another, the dominance of a purpose- and project-
oriented grant system is apparent. The amount of intergovernmental transfers from the
central government has traditionally made a substantial contribution to the total municipal
fiscal capacity in the investigated transformation countries, and such a trend is likely to
continue in the future. In other words, in adopting such abundant financial means, the
central government in these countries will further try to lead the provision of local public
goods and services, which, on the other hand, could make the process of carrying-out le-
gally assigned public activities by municipalities less ‘self governing’. Yet, it should be
emphasised that a full-scale realisation of the subsidiarity principle in the field of local
expenditure assignment should ideally be accompanied by the provision of sufficient own
fiscal resources and unconditional transfers which can be appropriately and efficiently
adopted by the individual municipalities according to their own needs.
13 In spite of the
‘one-time’ revenue character, non-tax revenues appear to remain as one of the major
budgetary resources in the mid-term for Czech and Slovak municipalities.
Local borrowings in forms of (mostly short- and mid-term) bank credits and communal
bonds have rapidly emerged as financial means to meet the increasing municipal expen-
diture needs in the investigated transition economies, although their significance has re-
mained rather moderate. Basically, there are neither legal limits for local credits nor inter-
vention of central government to restrict and to forbid borrowing activities (except in
Hungary), which means that the debt control primarily relies on market discipline without
the so-called bail-out guarantees of the central government. This can, however, encourage
the exessive borrowing behaviour of the individual municipalities. Partly due to the less
well-developed financial market, the long-term oriented lending mechanism is not yet
popular in the investigated countries, by which the total credit sum can be paid back
through the revenues generated by future infrastructure projects.
                                           
13  See, for example, the intergovernmental resource allocation system between the Länder and their munici-
palities in Germany (Steinherr, et al., 1997).23
The intergovernmental devolution of tax administration and the delegation of expendi-
ture responsibilities require a transparent, well-functioning and co-operative public (finan-
cial) management for both central and local governments to carry out all the expenditure-
and revenue-related activities in an efficient way. In other words, a successful fiscal de-
centralisation can only take place in a country when in all tiers of government the system-
atic tax collection and enforcement occurs in parallel with the sound expenditure choice of
local needs and cost-effective delivery of public goods and services. Apart from the legally
defined formulation of a standardised local budget, its approval, execution and supervi-
sion in all the investigated countries, the budgetary law of local governments is gener-
ally incorporated in the nation-wide budgetary law system. In spite of such a relatively
well-defined legal framework and recent efforts to enhance the municipal ability to or-
ganise efficient cash management, to introduce cost control mechanism, to better moni-
tor expenditures and to establish a well-functioning financial reporting system, etc., the
budgeting and accounting practice of local governments still fails to deliver adequate
information and a real overview on the financial situation and the accomplishment of
municipal activities. Most importantly, municipal budgets do not contain any informa-
tion about the off-budget activities of local governments. Since accounting standards for
local governments (particularly in the Czech Republic and Slovakia) do not require the
declaration of granted guarantees and/or other contingent liabilities, it is nearly impossi-
ble to estimate the extent of such warranties that individual local governments have pro-
vided.
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